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There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. 
There's the United States and there's Moody's Bond Rating 
Service. The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, 
and Moody's can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And 
believe me; it's not clear sometimes who's more powerful. 
 
 








This paper examines the impact of rating actions by Moody’s Investor Service on 
European long-term government bonds. First, it introduces credit rating agencies with 
special emphasize on their development and history. To understand their role in 
modern financial markets it is necessary to highlight the current market situation, 
especially peculiarities concerning market competition. Thereafter, a theoretical 
approach to evaluate a potential impact of rating changes is given. This part builds 
on efficient market hypothesis and the aspect of reputational capital, to identify 
potential sources of power. The following section then provides detailed empirical 
analysis by conducting an event study over a sample period from 2001 to 2012 for 
the current 27 member states of the European Union. The structure of the tests 
allowed for identifying abnormal reactions in interest rates caused by the change of 
the sovereign credit rating. Furthermore, Granger causality tests were used to 
analyze the role of credit default swaps. Finally, the last section analyzes possible 
countermeasures presented by European officials in order to overcome the powerful 
impact of credit rating agencies. Observations revealed a significant impact, at least 
for negative announcements. Finally, results showed that especially the foundation of 
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The role of credit rating agencies seems to become increasingly important 
nowadays. Modern financial markets are more open today, while at the same time 
also showing higher volatility and complexity than ever before. Accordingly, the 
demand for sophisticated analysis about default risk of offered securities caused an 
impressive growth in the credit rating market. And this continuous growth, combined 
with interesting peculiarities concerning the rating market, led to an actually 
questionable level of power.  
 
The current sovereign debt crises in European member states brought this debate to 
a new dimension. While at least European sovereigns have been rated rather stable 
for years, a series of considerable downgrades started with the beginning of the 
financial crisis in 2008. From that time on, even governments became under severe 
pressure from mainly two dominant rating agencies. Finally, credit rating agencies 
recently were at the center of attraction, dominating headlines throughout European 
press. However, while their power in modern financial markets was undisputed, the 
actual consequences of a rating change still were indistinct. Opinions about rating 
actions ranged from being a threat to complete irrelevance, as markets already 
adjusted before ratings have been announced. In other words, it was unclear whether 
a rating announcement was good, bad or no news at all.  
 
To examine the impact of sovereign credit ratings, an event study was conducted 
over a period from January 2001 to February 2012. This procedure allowed for 
identifying the informational value of rating announcements by spotting movements in 
security prices caused by the event. Before empirical tests are carried out, the paper 
provides a theoretical approach as well.  
 
The first section therefore contains detailed information about credit rating agencies. 
This includes their impressive history, development of the market and some 
peculiarities of the industry, mainly concerning competition. Thereafter, functions and 
determinants of credit ratings are discussed in detail.  
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Section two develops a theoretical framework to identify the informational value of 
credit ratings. The main theory here is of course the efficient market hypothesis, 
which builds the background of empirical testing. The aim is to give a first hint why 
one should expect credit ratings to influence security prices at all.  
 
The following section then provides empirical testing of the informational value of 
sovereign credit ratings. Using an event study analysis, the impact of Moody’s rating 
announcements on European long-term government bonds is investigated. Granger 
causality tests then try to identify the role of credit default swaps. Besides detailed 
information about the used model and data, this section also includes results, 
interpretations and comparison to other studies. Although several studies already 
conducted the same type of investigation, only few included data after the beginning 
of 2008, when financial markets were characterized by general nervousness and 
series of downgrades.  
 
Finally, the last section introduces possibilities to overcome the power of credit rating 
agencies. The two dominant arguments in press and political debates on this behalf 
were more regulation and the foundation of a European rating agency. Based on 






Credit Rating Agencies 
 
 
History and Development 
 
 
The following chapters of this study will emphasize the role of CRAs in modern 
financial markets. To understand why their role seems to become increasingly 
important it is necessary to highlight the outstanding history and development of 
rating agencies. While the actual impact seems controversial today, there is 
absolutely no doubt that CRAs have been growing successfully over the past 
decades. The history of credit rating agencies started back in 1900, when John 
Moody (1868 – 1958) published Moody’s Manual of Industrial and Miscellaneous 
Securities, at the same time founding John Moody & Company.1 Just like the early 
work of Henry Varnum Poor (1812 – 1905) the manual contained detailed statistics 
on public and private securities. However, none of them did actually conclude 
anything about default risk of the issuer. The aim of such manuals only was to 
provide details about past performance of the issuing company or public institution.2 
The issuer’s future solvency was not part of the service and securities have not been 
categorized from the beginning.  
 
The most important driver for the demand for sophisticated financial analysis clearly 
was the railroad industry in the United States. The rapid expansion of the railroad 
system in the early 20th century forced building companies to offer securities to 
private investors to raise the necessary funds for their operations.3 Investors, on the 
other hand, had literally no information on the financial and operational details of the 
issuing companies. However, the railroad industry was by far the largest, most 
capital-intensive and fastest growing one at that time, which left investors in an 
adverse situation. The two companies recognized this shortfall and started to expand 
their services from statistical analyses to rating services as we know it today. From 
that time on, the focus was not on past performance exclusively anymore. Instead, 
                                                     
1
 Moody’s Investor Services: History on www.moodys.com 
2
 Standard and Poor’s: History on www.standardandpoors.com 
3
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 18) 
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issuers were classified according to their future default risk. Furthermore, rating 
categories have been introduced that already were very similar to the ones that are 
used today.  
 
Moody’s Investor Service started this service in 1913, when Standard Statistics still 
published pure statistical analysis. However, in 1922, Poor’s Publishing and Standard 
Statistics, at that time two separate companies, began to rate corporate bonds. One 
year later, the first stock market index was developed. From that point on, the 
business had not dramatically changed over time. One remarkable change has 
occurred in the 1960’s, when both companies started to charge issuers for rating 
services, instead of investors. Before, investors had to pay for information.4 The most 
impressive fact in the history of credit rating agencies is their fast growth in the first 
third of the 20th century. Just ten years after the development of credit ratings in 
1924, Moody’s Investor Service already covered nearly 100 % of the US bond 
market. However, credit rating agencies did, of course, face weaker periods as well. 
Especially the 1940’s, 50’s and 60’s showed low demand due to low volatility in 
financial markets. In the 1970’s, demand started to grow further and this trend has 
continued until today. 5 
 
The development of credit rating agencies already shows an intense concentration 
on the US market. The reason for this was the strong need for private financing of 
investment opportunities as mentioned above. Other, more recent factors have been 
the increasing complexity and openness of financial markets. More corporate and 
public issuers entered more volatile markets; the financial market became larger and 
larger.6 The number of defaults has increased as well, which also sustained the need 
for credit ratings. And still, this concentration is apparent today, which gave rise to 
criticism especially in the past years of financial crises. Basically, the two companies 
described earlier are still predominant in the global market. Moody’s Investor Service 
and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) held a market share of 39 percent and 40 percent, 
respectively, in 2007. The third agency, Fitch Ratings, had only 16 percent of global 
                                                     
4
 Moody’s Investor Services: History on www.moodys.com, Standard and Poor’s: History on 
www.standardandpoors.com  
5
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 18) 
6
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 640) 
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credit ratings and is, therefore, significantly smaller. 7 Some studies even state that 
Moody’s and S&P are actually in a duopoly.8  
 
Today, S&P as well as Moody’s, cover 100 percent of US corporate and government 
bonds, and the vast majority of global securities. Starting from stocks and bonds, 
today’s rating activities include sovereigns, mutual funds, insurance and structured 
finance products as well. A further source for criticism is the ownership structure of 
the two dominant CRAs. Both are private in terms of ownership, meaning that 
although they are regulated by government, they are not public organizations. 
However, published ratings in some cases restrict the securities that can be held by 
other regulated organizations, which gives them a public purpose at the same time.9  
 
Of course, the development of CRAs raises one question: Why did no other rating 
agency enter the market if it has been growing over decades and, therefore, provided 
such promising opportunities? The answer to this question can be found if one 
considers the regulation of credit rating agencies. In 1975, the US Securities and 
Exchange Comission (SEC) relied on nationally recognized statistical rating 
organizations (NRSROs10). According to this regulation, only ratings of certain rating 
agencies were used for other regulated entities.11 This made the credit rating market 
unattractive for new entries, as it was unclear how a new agency could have been 
approved by the SEC as a NRSRO, there were no common standards. Furthermore, 
reputational capital and the immense coverage rates of existing agencies are 
important entry barriers as well. However, the industry shows considerable operating 
margins and exceptional profitability.12  
 
Indeed, the regulation of CRAs is an important aspect and has been the basis for 
extensive criticism, especially in times of financial crisis or the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe, more recently. This aspect will therefore be highlighted in the following 
chapter.  
                                                     
7
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 641) 
8
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 95) 
9
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 641) 
10
 Other studies also use „NRSOs“ 
11
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 642) 
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Functions of Credit Ratings 
 
 
Rom (2009) defines a rating agency as ”…a company that assesses the debt 
instruments (bond or other securities) issued by firms or governments and assigns 
‘credit ratings’ to these instruments based on the likelihood that the debt will be 
repaid.” This definition already shows the clear distinction between the early stages 
of Moody’s and S&P and their function today. While they published pure financial 
information about past performance at the beginning, they started to assess the 
credit quality of the issuers thereafter. In this sense, past performance is just one of 
the factors influencing the credit rating of an issuer. Instead, CRAs today assess 
default risk which basically means that the future ability to pay back the debt is 
valued in advance. But default risk is not meant to be a certain percentage or an 
absolute value but rather the relative risk compared to other securities. In this sense, 
CRAs would serve as information intermediaries and add value by reducing 
information costs for market participants.13 It is therefore important to state that the 
quality of a credit rating is highly dependent on the quality of the raters and the 
information they are using to estimate default risk.14  
 
However, the function of CRAs is not limited to the simple assignment of credit 
ratings. Already back in 1930, credit ratings had a regulatory purpose as well. US 
regulators used the assigned ratings to limit the riskiness of assets held by other 
regulated entities.15 This basically restricted the selection of assets for those 
organizations. They were only allowed to invest in securities that are currently rated 
above a certain benchmark, and this practice was even more applied in the 1970’s. 
Today this approach is used throughout developed countries.16 Rating agencies are 
therefore often referred to as “de facto capital market gate keepers”, while they have 
no legal responsibility for their publications.17 In this sense one can observe two main 
functions of credit ratings. In the first one, the CRA takes the role of an information 
                                                     
13
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 9) 
14
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 642) 
15
 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 2) 
16
 cf. Kerwer (2005, p. 463) 
17
 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 3) 
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intermediary. It collects all available information about the issuer and evaluates the 
creditworthiness of the issuing company or government. In a way, CRAs can 
contribute to limit the principal agent problem inherent in every credit granting 
process. This is due to the fact, that the issuer typically has superior information 
about his own creditworthiness, which is not available for the investor. CRAs now 
take the role of an independent third party and provide a screening instrument for 
investors.18  
 
This aspect of asymmetric information between the issuer and the investor can be 
found in several studies throughout literature. However, the role of CRAs is often 
described as easing the problem.19 In contrast, other, more recent papers do not 
support this aspect at all. Instead, they highlight the ambiguous role of rating 
agencies. Especially authors who focus on misperceptions of CRAs highlight the fact 
that the quality of credit ratings is highly dependent on the raters.20 Furthermore, 
there is still a possibility of asymmetric information between the issuer and the credit 
rating agency. If one considers a standard process of credit granting, the issuer has 
more information about his own credit risk compared to an investor, as mentioned 
above. If the issuer provides good information, the investor would not believe it at all, 
as both parties know that the issuer benefits from publishing wrong information.21  
 
However, the same problem arises when CRAs are collecting information about an 
issuer. Some articles therefore highlight the fact, that credit ratings are just as good 
as the underlying information.22 On the other hand, even in real life it is observable 
that investors seem to ignore that fact and rely on the assigned ratings. In practice, 
credit ratings serve as a kind of monitoring instrument, which basically means that, 
for example, fund managers take action if the rating changes to a lower level. 
Especially when structured finance products found increasing demand, this 
procedure became dangerous. Financial products became more complex and difficult 
to value. But, fortunately, rating agencies covered those products as well, which led 
to institutional investors and even banks selling any product, as long as it was rated 
                                                     
18
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 9) 
19
 cf. Kerwer (2005, pp. 459) 
20
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 641) 
21
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 9) 
22
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 641) 
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as “investment grade”.23 This aspect shows a further function of credit ratings, as the 
coverage of products can easily fuel demand for them, especially if products are very 
complex and ratings are relatively high (investment grade). On the other hand, if 
investors fully rely on the assessment of CRAs, a series of downgrades can lead to a 
complete collapse of a market.24 If it comes out later that ratings were unjustified, 
investors tend to lose trust in ratings for other securities of a certain product category 
as well.25 It is therefore important to state that the information intermediation function 
of CRAs is not unquestioned. The analysis part of this paper will investigate this 
aspect in detail.  
 
The regulatory function of CRAs is even more disputed today. As mentioned before, 
credit ratings have been used to restrict investment of regulated entities over 
decades. However, this practice has some serious deficiencies. It turned out that 
institutional investors tended to evaluate securities with the same rating as equally 
risky. On the other hand, CRAs never claimed to publish any recommendation to 
buy, sell, or hold an asset. Furthermore, other important figures like market liquidity 
or price volatility are not even part of a credit rating.26 This situation highlights the 
controversial application of credit ratings. CRAs see their own ratings as opinions on 
the credit worthiness of an issuer. This is the reason why they claim a status similar 
to financial journalists, which protects them against litigation and direct regulation. On 
the other hand, ratings have been used in real life as financial advice, in contrast. 
Governments restricted trading for regulated entities based on the credit rating of a 
security, while rating methodologies have not been regulated at all. Some studies 
refer to this as certification function, therefore.27 In a way, CRAs provided a license to 
trade these securities, although they only had voluntary guidelines or best-practice 
standards instead of legal frameworks. In this sense, the rapid growth and the 
increasing importance of credit ratings has been fuelled by governments that have 
effectively outsourced the monitoring of financial instruments. Over time, credit 
ratings even became a prerequisite to offer debt instruments.28  
                                                     
23
 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 3) 
24
 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 3) 
25
 cf. Rom (2009, p. 644) 
26
 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 1) 
27
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 9) 
28
 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 3) 
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The Role of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
 
 
Sovereign credit ratings are of great importance for several reasons. First of all, the 
increasing size, complexity and openness of financial markets forces not only 
corporate, but also government issuers to rely on the services of CRAs. However, 
there are some peculiarities about sovereign ratings which will be part of the 
following chapter. An important factor, and quite obvious, is that governments 
typically issue securities of immense amounts. It is therefore necessary to attract as 
much investors as possible, which is considerably easier if the security is already 
rated. Especially international investors are much more likely to invest, if one of the 
major CRAs has assigned a rating symbol.29  
 
Furthermore, the rating symbol assigned to a sovereign often limits the ratings for 
other issuers of the same nationality. This means that a company would typically not 
achieve a higher rating than the government of its country of origin. In literature, this 
fact is often referred to as sovereign or country ceiling.30 Of course, as governments 
try to establish stable and promising economies, they would therefore be interested 
in getting the best possible credit rating for their own securities. Recently, the foreign 
currency long-term rating was not the only rating of interest. As investors increasingly 
hold securities denominated in other currencies than the traditional global ones, the 
domestic credit rating becomes more and more important.31 Nonetheless, the foreign 
long-term rating is still dominant when dealing with sovereign credit ratings.  
 
All in all, this shows that even governments cannot ignore the role of CRAs. As 
sovereigns are heavily dependent on financial markets to raise the required financial 
funds they are interested in achieving a high rating. The current debt crisis in Europe 
is perfectly supporting this theory. Especially when public finance is already heavily 
restricted, a downgrade of the credit rating can bring even governments in severe 
difficulties.  
  
                                                     
29
 cf. Cantor et al. (1996, p. 38) 
30
 cf. Dittrich (2007, p. 118) 
31






Although CRAs assess the relative default risk of issuers of numerous securities, the 
symbols used are exactly the same. The two biggest and most important agencies, 
Moody’s and S&P do actually not use the same symbols. However, they are 
comparable, as every rating symbol of Moody’s finds its counterpart in the S&P list 
and vice versa. Typically, the list starts with the best rating achievable, the so-called 
triple A. Securities with this rating accordingly show the lowest relative default risk 
when compared with other products of the same category. Thereafter, the list goes 
on with each step meaning an increase in default risk of the issuer.  
 
To give an even more fine-tuned evaluation, ratings within a group have additional 
symbols. Moody’s uses the numbers 1, 2 and 3 to represent whether the security of 
interest is at the top, in the middle or at the bottom among other issuers of the same 
rating symbol. S&P also uses this procedure but adds a “+” or “-“ to a given rating 
symbol. Furthermore, rating symbols are typically divided in two groups, namely 
investment grade and speculative grade. Investment grade includes ratings from Aaa 
(AAA) to Baa3 (BBB-).32 Accordingly, speculative grade ratings range from Ba1 
(BB+) to B3 (B-). As the name already tells, investment grade securities do, of 
course, show higher creditworthiness compared to speculative grade ones. In fact, 
speculative grade already means considerable uncertainty about future payback or 










                                                     
32
 Symbols in brackets are the equivalent of S&P 
33







However, CRAs do not only directly change credit ratings. Often, sovereigns are 
investigated in advance, which is published as well. Moody’s uses the term “On 
Watch” if the current rating is in review.34 S&P again has a very similar procedure 
and puts sovereigns on a so-called “Watch List” if a change is likely. In addition, both 
CRAs also release the direction of the change, or, in few cases, that the direction is 
unclear at the moment. The following graph shows the general rating symbols for 
Moody’s and the corresponding explanations.  
  
                                                     
34
 cf. Cantor et al. (1996, p. 45) 
Graph 1: General Rating Symbols of Moody's Investor Service 
19 
 
This general list is then modified according to the type of security issued. For this 
purpose, the rating definitions for sovereign ratings are given as well. It is important 
to note the differences when dealing with sovereign credit ratings. While corporate 
ratings typically refer to the ability to pay back obligations, sovereign ratings include 
the willingness to pay. History shows, that governments sometimes refused 
payments although they actually had the required financial resources. The decision 
not to fulfill its debt obligations is therefore not only dependent on financial resources 








The characteristics mentioned in the explanations refer to the determinants of 
sovereign credit ratings and will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter of this 
paper. However, the symbols are of course the same again, and, although not 
mentioned explicitly here, numbers are used as modifiers to show the relative 










The determinants of sovereign credit ratings are manifold and very complex. The 
model used by Moody’s to assess a government’s relative default risk contains 
quantitative as well as qualitative factors. For transparency purposes, this 
methodology is published and available for free. However, the relative weights that 
are assigned to each of those factors are not given, which makes it almost 
impossible to retrace the way to a current credit rating.35 It is obvious that especially 
qualitative factors depend heavily on the subjective assessment of the responsible 
analyst. The rating determinants of Mood’s Investor Service are given here in detail. 
Unless stated otherwise, the upcoming chapter follows the official rating 
methodologies for sovereigns.36  
 
Moody’s describes the process of assigning a certain credit rating in three stages. 
First, the country’s economic resiliency is estimated. The important factors are 
spread in two groups. The first one contains evaluations about the economic strength 
of a country, whereas the second one deals with the institutional strength. The 
primary figure for the first group is, of course, GDP per capita. To avoid cyclical 
effects, Moody’s is working with 3 to 5 year averages, which is one reason why 
sovereign ratings do not respond to short-term movements in economies. Other 
indicators include volatility of output, level of innovation, investment into human 
capital, integration into economic or trade zones and finally the simple size of a 
country. All these factors are crucial when economic shocks have to be absorbed, 
which means that they are directly influencing the country’s ability to survive 
downturns. What these factors have in common is that they are quantifiable and, 
therefore, easily comparable among different sovereigns.  
 
The second group, evaluating the institutional strength of a country, introduces more 
qualitative criteria. Basically, a well working institutional framework is essential to 
provide a relative safe and predictable environment required for continuous growth. 
Factors here are respect of property rights, efficiency and predictability of 
                                                     
35
 cf. Cantor et al. (1996, p. 38) 
36
 Moody’s Investor Service: Rating Methodology for Sovereign Bond Ratings (2008) 
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government action, transparency and consensus among political parties for main 
goals. The term “institutions” here is equivalent to the set of formal rules in a country. 
Basically, this group deals with the political stability, especially in times of unrest.  
 
The second process to assign a credit rating introduces the financial strength of the 
country. The task is to analyze the financial situation not only at the point in time 
when the relative risk is evaluated but rather in a dynamic environment. Basically, the 
first indicator is, like with corporate ratings, the balance sheet of the country. The 
question is whether the financial resources necessary to repay sovereign debt are 
heavily restricting government action or not. This factor is again quantitative and 
measures the risk that a country is simply not able to raise the required amount of 
money to repay its obligations stemming from debt securities.  
 
Especially for developing countries, this factor is crucial. Often, international investors 
were not willing to accept the currency risk inherent when buying debt securities from 
such issuers. Accordingly, governments had to issue instruments in foreign currency 
to attract international or institutional investors. As a consequence, it became of 
interest whether resources of foreign currency where sufficient to repay debt 
obligations. Credit ratings of those countries have therefore often been influenced by 
difficulties to raise funds in hard currency (mostly Dollar denominated). The key 
figure is the percentage rate of revenues, that is spend on repaying debt obligations. 
This procedure takes into account, that equal absolute amounts of debt can have 
different impact, as interest rates are different.  
 
However, it is not enough to assess the financial strength exclusively at one specific 
moment. The second important question is how vulnerable public finance is. Analysts 
try to evaluate the financial robustness over time, and especially the reaction to 
adverse political, financial or economic developments. This process allows for 
dynamic stress tests that are necessary to provide a dynamic rating methodology. 
Whereas the static measurement is quite straightforward, the dynamic approach is a 
lot more complex. Especially for countries, it is hard to quantify future liabilities that 
might arise. As we have seen during the financial crisis of 2008, bail-out payments 
can easily end up in severe troubles for whole governments. The same is true for 
currently unfunded pension liabilities. The task for analysts is not only to quantify 
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those liabilities but also to assign adequate weights according to the probability of 
materialization.  
 
Last but not least, the structure of debt is a further source of difficulties. This factor 
contains liquidity and exchange rate matters, primarily, but also accounts for 
disadvantageous repayment schedules. If public finance is already highly restricted, 
adverse indexed debt securities, with respect to interest and exchange rates, can 
end up in financial distress quite fast.  
 
The last factor for the second process is the ability to react to disadvantageous 
developments. Basically, the question is how much space a government has to 
move. This typically includes the revenues as well as the expenditures side. There 
are several political actions to set up financial funds to repay debt obligations. In this 
sense, governments could increase tax levels or introduce new tax burdens on the 
one hand, or reduce public expenditures, on the other. However, both methods have 
their limits in terms of acceptance of society. But, like companies, governments can 
of course also sell assets or simply issue new debt to repay existing obligations. Both 
methods do make sense, of course. Although they do not change the government’s 
solvency, they can make a difference in liquidity.  
 
All these factors show how difficult it is to evaluate a country’s relative default risk. 
Even for analysts of CRA with decades of experience in sovereign ratings it is still 
challenging, especially if one considers the dynamic approach. Furthermore, there is 
one crucial difference between corporate and sovereign issuers. While companies 
can be forced to repay its obligations by insolvency proceedings, governments might 
simply not be willing to repay their debt. This is a situation that could be observed in 
real life several times. Sovereigns actually were able to repay but they simply did not. 
Even this strategic default factor is reflected in sovereign ratings.  
 
Furthermore, it shows that investors face a challenging task if they attempt to 
evaluate the default risk of sovereign debt instruments on their own. The increasing 
complexity and number of factors might be a reason to simply rely on the 




The last step for CRA is the assignment of the actual credit rating. All the above 
mentioned indicators are summed up in one symbol. The relationship between the 




Graph 3: Final Rating Assignment 
 
source: MIS: Sovereign Bond Rating Methodologies 
 
Although factors are quantitative, they are summed up in qualitative categories 
ranging from “Very high” to “Very Low” for both feature categories. Economic 
resiliency specifies a certain rating range for the country. Accordingly, the different 
stripes within one category account for different levels of financial robustness. As we 
can see, even after applying both factors, there is still a range open for the actual 
rating, which basically means that even this complex model does not smash out only 
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one possibility. After all, it is the subjective opinion of the responsible analyst that 
ultimately sets the final rating symbol.  
 
This is in short what happens when Moody’s assigns a rating for any sovereign in the 
world. Although the model seems reasonable, there have been numerous attempts to 
validate given ratings to the rating determinants. Cantor and Packer (1996) used a 
standard regression model and introduced eight of the determinants. The categories 
included income per capita, GDP growth, inflation, fiscal balance, external balance, 
external debt and indicators for economic development and default history. Using this 
model, they tried to find the relationship of those variables and the assigned rating by 
Moody’s and S&P. As with every regression model, the major question was how 
strong the explanatory power of the variables would be. All in all they included 49 
sovereigns which made up a representative group as all rating categories but the 
ones for default were represented by these countries.  
 
The result of this study was quite impressive, as the model was able to explain about 
90 % of sample variation. Furthermore, they found that not all of the variables had 
strong explanatory power regarding the assigned rating symbol. In detail, the three 
factors showing no clear relationship were GDP growth, fiscal balance and external 
balance. However, the statistical power to explain larger differences in ratings is 
undoubtedly remarkable. The limitations of the model, which are by the way 
mentioned in the study, are that it is not very strong to predict smaller differences. 
Another limitation stems from the fact that quantitative models will never be able to 
explain literally all of the sample variation, as CRAs already stated that qualitative 
factors are included as well. Those factors, mostly influencing the social and political 
environment, cannot be taken into account adequately. Furthermore, to explain an 
actual assigned rating symbol, it would be necessary to use the same weights as 
CRAs. As mentioned above, CRAs do not publish any information about the relative 




The Informational Value of Credit Ratings 
 
 
The following part will introduce a theoretical approach on the informational value of 
credit ratings, before the empirical part will investigate this matter in detail. The 
ultimate question when dealing with informational value of CRAs is whether they are 
able to add anything to publicly available information in the market or not. If so, prices 
for securities, in this case interest rates for long-term government bonds, should 
always fully reflect all available information. In this sense, the actual change of a 
sovereign credit rating would immediately reveal new information and prices should 
react accordingly.  
 
 
Efficient Market Model 
 
 
The theoretical basis of this mechanism is the efficient market model by Fama 
(1970). In this model, the future expected return for a given security depends on 
investors’ expectations based on a certain set of information. If this set of information, 
usually noted as Φ, changes, prices should react immediately. If this is the case, 
prices always convey all available information.37 However, there are several 
requirements for efficient markets to provide proper application of this mechanism.38 
First, the perfectly efficient market has no transaction costs when dealing with 
securities. Furthermore, information would be free of charge and available to all 
investors in the market. Finally, the implications of new information would never be 
controversial. The last point basically means, that investors fully agree on the 
consequences stemming from new information.  
 
When analyzing these ideal conditions, it becomes obvious that real-life markets do 
not fulfill these assumptions. We actually do have transaction costs when dealing 
with securities. Information is only to a certain degree free of charge, and the 
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 cf. Fama (1970, p. 388) 
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 cf. Fama (1970, pp. 387) 
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implications are often debatable. On the other hand, we should note here that these 
conditions would provide efficient markets, but they are not indispensable.  
 
Going back from general theory, the efficient market conditions will now be analyzed 
for sovereign debt instruments to identify whether this mechanism can actually work. 
Starting with transaction costs, even large ones would not directly lead to inefficient 
markets. Although large transaction costs could reduce the flow of transactions, this 
would not be proof for market inefficiency.39 The second condition is more complex to 
investigate. To fulfill the above mentioned conditions, all investors should have 
access to relevant information.  
 
However, whether this condition is fulfilled or not is difficult to answer, and not within 
the scope of this paper. The relevant question here is whether CRAs can help to 
provide more information to all investors. In this sense, CRAs would contribute to 
making markets more efficient in terms of information. Basically, at least quantitative 
data is published by independent organizations providing investors with free and 
unbiased information. However, the opposite is true when dealing with political 
factors. Of course, information about future political actions is published by 
government officials. But one should not forget that governments want to attract 
investors in international capital markets. Furthermore, they have to convince 
citizens, always keeping in mind the next elections.  
 
CRAs typically have representatives for each sovereign. These senior analysts are 
responsible for only one country and often entrusted with this task for many years. As 
a consequence, they built strong networks with leaders of governmental institutions. 
Furthermore, this network includes representatives of national research institutes as 
well. The reason behind this procedure is to gain first-hand information from several 
sources. If we think about ministries of finance or high-level employees of research 
institutes it becomes obvious that these sources are not available for other investors 
in the market. Finally, all information gathered in this process is then used to define 
the final credit rating. In this sense, a credit rating should reveal new information, 
which was not available for other investors before.  
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Keeping in mind the conditions from the efficient market model, we can now state 
that CRAs do have a positive impact in making markets more efficient. Of course, 
perfect capital markets where all information is publicly available is still not met in 
reality, but CRAs are able to reduce information asymmetries. Furthermore, in the 
1960’s, CRAs started to charge the issuer for credit ratings, instead of investors. 
Today, we can therefore state that current sovereign credit ratings are available to all 
investors free of charge.  
 
As a summary for the second condition one should note that CRAs can actively 
contribute to higher market efficiency. In their role as information intermediaries they 
gather information that would usually not be part of the publicly available set of 
information for other investors in the market. Finally, they publish current credit 
ratings, which include all information, free of charge for all investors. However, this 
does not ultimately proof that prices react to rating announcements immediately. The 
final and most crucial condition for CRAs is the last requirement of the efficient 
market model. According to the theoretical approach, investors should agree on the 
impact of new information. If we put this general condition into practice for CRAs, the 
question raises whether investors rely on the assessments of rating agencies. Before 
this factor is analyzed on the level of individual investors, a more general approach is 






Rating Quality and Reputational Capital 
 
 
If one considers information from government officials, we should not forget that they 
have an incentive to obtain a high credit rating for the above mentioned reasons. 
Furthermore, it is the issuer that pays for the credit rating. In fact, these conditions 
have fuelled criticism on CRAs recently, especially when dealing with sovereigns. 
Basically, the idea is that it would be very easy for CRAs to gain profits from 
publishing biased information about the issuer.40 And governments would well be 
willing to pay for an unjustified rating as it would reduce financing costs of 
government debt by lower interest rates based on wrong information. In the short-
run, CRAs and governments would gain while investors would clearly suffer from this 
procedure. However, this changes in the long-run. Especially the two dominant rating 
agencies, Moody’s and S&P, look back on a very successful history.41 While 
governments discuss regulation, CRAs do actively and regularly examine their past 
rating success. For this purpose, they check whether a significant number of well 
rated entities unexpectedly went bankrupt. And history clearly supports the 
evaluations of CRAs. Within investment grade rated entities, both by Moody’s and 
S&P, only few have defaulted, showing an immense quality in credit ratings.42  
 
And this track of success is the main source for investors’ trust that CRAs have. One 
should not forget that this is the only way to assess the quality of credit ratings. 
Investors are not able to evaluate the quality of a current rating assigned to a certain 
sovereign. Instead, they investigate correlations between past ratings and defaults. If 
this correlation is high enough, an investor would believe that the current rating is 
justified as well. This aspect is well accepted in literature and often referred to as the 
“reputational capital” of a CRA.43 If one examines the role of reputational capital in 
detail, it becomes clear that it is crucial for success and market power. Basically, 
what this means is that investors would prefer ratings from reliable CRAs with high 
reputation. This drives demand for ratings from that agency on the issuer side, 
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because they want to attract as much investors as possible and keep borrowing 
costs low at the same time.  
 
As a consequence, especially new securities would therefore tend to seek ratings 
from well established rating agencies. On the one hand, this acts as an entry barrier 
in the credit rating market, as new agencies cannot provide such a successful 
history. On the other hand, this enables CRAs to gain higher margins for their rating 
activities.44 As high quality agencies are preferred, on the investor and issuer side, 
they have the power to gain higher prices compared to low quality agencies. 
Ultimately, there is literally no space in this industry for low quality providers. Finally, 
this aspect also provides an answer for the question why CRAs do not publish 
favorable ratings. The short-term profit from publishing wrong credit ratings is simply 
not high enough to exceed the future losses stemming from reductions in reputational 
capital. CRAs therefore have a clear incentive to keep quality as high as possible to 
keep the trust of investors and issuers. And the same goes for short-term cost 
reductions if ratings are assigned with poor analytics in advance.  
 
It is therefore necessary to state, that, even in the absence of government regulation, 
CRAs are highly dependent on the quality of their rating announcements. It is the 
rating quality that provides market power, profitability and growth in the long-run. In 
fact, low quality is not an option, as it would lead to considerable losses in market 
share. This would result in a strong decrease in demand of ratings form this agency 
and, as a consequence, it would leave the market. The current market situation 
clearly supports this idea, as we observe two dominant rating agencies, both with an 
outstanding history of success and similar market share. The key to success 
therefore is expertise and independence.45  
 
Now it is possible to analyze the last condition of the efficient market model. Again, 
according to this condition, investors should agree on the impact and significance of 
new information. In fact, Fama (1970) already notes that not all investors have to 
evaluate the consequences literally the same. It is sufficient, if deviations are 
stemming from differences in the ability to assess the value of new information. Up to 
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now, there is no evidence to claim that financial markets are inefficient. The question 
now is whether we observe reactions in prices because of rating announcements, 
and can only be answered by conducting empirical tests.  
 
Summing up the important facts from the theoretical approach one can state that 
CRAs can have an impact on market prices. Given that markets are efficient, prices 
should react immediately if a credit rating reveals new information. Furthermore, they 
should react as well if investors believe that CRAs are able to better evaluate a given 
set of information. In this case, there would be no new information at all, but investors 
rely on CRAs and value their estimations more than their own assessments.  
 
However, a final statement can only be given after testing the impact of past rating 











To analyze the impact of rating actions it is necessary to apply a model that is 
capable of showing reactions in a certain time period following the announcement. A 
simple regression model is therefore not appropriate. This model would show clear 
interactions, but, at the same time, would be unable to predict their direction. This 
basically means that it would remain unclear whether the rating causes a change in 
interest rates or just follows them, as both are dependent on changes in economic 
fundamentals or creditworthiness of a sovereign, more general. To overcome this 
problem, an event study was conducted to investigate the impact of rating 
announcements on interest rates. An event study has the important advantage to add 
a time factor to the model. As mentioned before, it is absolutely clear that there will 
be an adjustment in interest rates if the underlying factors are changing.  
 
This becomes obvious if one considers the example of severe difficulties in public 
financing of a certain sovereign. When bad information is revealed, and given that it 
is significant, interest rates will adjust immediately. However, it takes some time 
before rating actions are actually done. CRAs first analyze the new situation and 
estimate the consequences. Only after a certain time of investigation, a rating change 
is finally published, if necessary. Without taking the time factor into account we would 
easily find a significant relationship which would lead to the rash conclusion that 
rating actions have a strong impact on interest rates. However, it is the time factor 
that indicates whether interest rates react to information already available, or on 
rating announcements.  
 
The structure of the event study basically follows MacKinlay (1997). However, there 
have been some adjustments in order to adjust it to debt instruments rather than for 
common equity, which makes it necessary to explain it in detail here. The first step 
was to define the event that should be investigated, which are in this case rating 
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announcements of Moody’s Investor Service. The securities of interest are long-term 
government bonds of the current 27 member states of the European Union.46 The 
event window, in which interest rates have been investigated, has been set to 14 
days around the event. This is basically due to the fact that government bonds are 
not traded as frequently as stocks, which made it necessary to extend the window in 
order not to miss the adjustment in interest rates. The event window starts three days 
before the announcement and then goes on until ten days after the event. This period 
is still short enough to avoid reactions to other factors while infrequent trading is 
taken into account.  
 
To assess the impact of the event it is necessary to estimate interest rates as if no 
event has taken place. This procedure is commonly accepted for event studies and 
requires computing “normal” interest rates first. These normal rates are then 
compared with actual ex-post ones, which allows observing the difference as 
“abnormal” returns. In this model, interest rates were supposed to depend on two 
factors. First of all, interest rates of government bonds do heavily depend on the 
general level of interest rates. Precisely, it consists of a risk free interest rate and 
premiums for credit risk and maturity. However, government bonds of this sample all 
have a remaining maturity of ten years, which allows for simplification of the model. 
Accordingly, the interest rates depend on the risk free rate and a premium for credit 
risk as assessed with currently available information. This relationship can be shown 
by the following term: 
 
 
                       
 
 
Where r is the interest rate for sovereign i at time t, which is the sum of the riskfree 
rate (rf) at time t and a premium for credit risk (p), assessed on a currently available 
set of information (  . This simple approach already shows an important problem 
when dealing with changes in interest rates of government bonds. A change in the 
event period can be caused by a change in the underlying risk free rate and would 
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not tell anything about the premium for credit risk. In fact, this premium could remain 
the same although interest rates are changing over time. This made it necessary to 
implement an approximation for the risk free rate to avoid misinterpretations.  
 
Based on this approach, estimations were made for the event window as if there has 
been no event at all. The estimation window was set to 120 observations for each 
security. The window stops ten days before the event and goes back until 120 values 
are available for estimation purposes. After all, all relevant information about 
estimation and event window is shown in the following graph. 
 
 




For estimation of normal rates, a simple regression model has been applied. This 
model assumes a linear relationship between interest rates of government bonds and 
the risk free rate. For this purpose, neither a constant mean nor a market model 
would have led to sound results. Therefore, a single factor model was developed, 
including the risk-free rate instead of a market or portfolio return. The basic 
regression term is given as 
 
 
                      
 
 




This implies that the current interest rate of the security depends on the risk free rate. 
Furthermore, the constant term allows for a continuous difference to model the 
influence of credit risk. The idea behind this approach is that α should be greater if 
credit risk is relatively high for a given sovereign. As mentioned before, the 
implementation of the risk free rate allows eliminating misestimating due to 
movements of the general interest rate level. An OLS calculation was used to derive 
unbiased and efficient estimators for α and β for each security as47: 
 
 
    
                      
   
   
       
   










    
 
 
     
   





    
 
 
     
   




Having the estimators, it was possible to calculate normal interest rates over the 
event window. The obtained rates served as approximations for the case of no event 
taking place. Normal rates were calculated by 
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for each of the 14 days around the event. In order to investigate the impact of a rating 
announcement, the estimated normal rates were then compared to the actual 
observed rates.  
 




                 
 
 
Again, abnormal rates have been calculated for every day of the event window. The 
structure of the calculations has been the same regardless whether a downgrade or 
upgrade was investigated, which leaves the following possibilities for the obtained 
abnormal rates. If we observe negative AR, the event has a positive impact from the 
perspective of the country of interest, as interest rates have decreased after the 
event. On the other hand, positive AR would indicate a negative impact as interest 
rates increased after the event. Thus, if AR is 0, the event of a rating announcement 
has had absolutely no effect on the interest rates of the government bond.  
 
This procedure was repeated for each and every rating announcement in the sample 
period. As a last step, the obtained ARs had to be aggregated through time and 
across sovereigns. First, aggregation through time was done by summing up the ARs 
for every day of the event window and dividing the sum by the number of days. 
These mean ARs over time are given as 
 
 
    
      
 







where d is the number of days in the event window, in this case 14. With this 
procedure, the average impact over the event window is estimated for each security. 
As interest rates were observed as returns per annum, an accumulation would have 
been without any significance, as it is not possible to realize these cumulated returns 
in real life. This approach is often used for stock price analysis but does not lead to 
sound results for debt instruments. The obtained average abnormal rates now were 
still on the security level, so far. To estimate the average impact of a certain rating 
announcement, aggregation now had to be done across securities as well. Indeed, 
the calculations were now done for different groups of rating announcements in order 
to get significant results. There has been no change of sign according to the direction 
of the rating action. If calculations would not have been spread now, equal reactions 
for positive and negative announcements would have caused a zero mean impact 
and misinterpretations, therefore.  
 
Finally, the average impact of each of the rating actions was derived as 
 
 
   
    
 





The aggregation is basically done by dividing the sum of security-level abnormal 
rates by the number of securities in a certain group of rating actions. This procedure 
was repeated for all rating actions, including downgrades, upgrades and positive and 
negative “ON WATCH” announcements. The obtained average abnormal rates are 
now independent from time and security.  
 
At the end of the empirical work, a two-sided t-test was applied to investigate whether 











For the events, the sample contains all credit rating announcements of Moody’s 
Investor Service between January 1st 2001 and February 13th 2012. These 
announcements include actual downgrades and upgrades as well as “On Watch” 
announcements. In these cases, the rating was not directly changed but a possible 
rating action and its direction have been published in advance. All in all, Moody’s 
published 108 rating announcements in the sample period. Detailed information 
about rating actions is given in the following table. 
 
 





Rating actions were classified by the above mentioned rating action types. Due to 
data availability reasons, 7 rating actions were not included in the empirical analysis. 
In these cases, interest rates were not sufficiently available for empirical tests, which 
made it necessary to eliminate these observations. Otherwise, too short estimation 
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windows would have predicted insignificant estimators for the event window. Of 
course, a sound interpretation of results would have been impossible.  
An important fact concerning rating actions is their concentration in time. The 
financial crisis in 2007 also heavily affected sovereigns and their financial situation. 
This results in clusters of rating actions over time. While there are more upgrades in 
the first half of the sample period, the second shows more downgrades. This is not a 
further problem for empirical tests; unfortunately it diminishes the meaningfulness of 
comparison over time, as rating actions are not distributed equally.  
 
To make this situation obvious, the following graph shows different rating activities 
over the sample period. Despite the fact, that downgrades increased dramatically, 
the overall number of rating actions has increased as well. The last full year in the 
sample, 2011, shows an absolute peak of 30 rating actions for sovereigns. This 
reflects the turbulent situation of financial markets this year, as well as the impact on 
sovereigns.  
 









Data for securities was taken from the official Eurostat database. Eurostat, an 
institution of the EU for statistical surveys and analysis, publishes data on a variety of 
topics in an online database. For this study, long-term interest rates for government 
bonds have been downloaded. In contrast to other studies on this topic, data has a 
daily frequency, which is advantageous for the event study. Daily data allowed for 
keeping the event window rather short, including only 14 observations for every 
event. Other studies, relying on monthly data, have the problem that other factors 
could influence interest rates as the event window captures at least 30 days. 
Furthermore, monthly data often contains average values which would smooth the 
impact of rating announcements. Interest rates collected by Eurostat include 
government bonds with a remaining maturity of 10 years for all 27 member states of 
the EU. Unfortunately, for new member states, data is available of course only short 
before their entry into the EU. This fact made it necessary to eliminate 7 rating 
announcements.  
 
However, the important advantage of using data from this one source is that Eurostat 
ensures full comparability among the member states. This means that potential 
sources of observation errors are reduced to a minimum. Furthermore, as included 
government bonds were continuously exchanged according to their remaining 
maturity, the influence of this factor can be ignored as well. Interest rates are given 
as returns per annum, for all cases. Due to this fact, the above mentioned 
adjustments had to be made, resulting in an aggregation of abnormal rates by 
calculating the mean impact, rather than the sum of abnormal rates. To capture all 
rating announcements, the sample period of interest rates of government bonds 
ranges from January 1st 2001 to February 29th 2012. This ensures that the last rating 
announcements of February 13th 2012 are well included with the whole event 
window. The following table provides some descriptive statistics for all sovereigns, 







Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Long-Term Government Bond Returns (p.a.) 
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Approximation of a Risk-Free Interest Iate 
 
 
Finally, for estimation procedures as given above, it was necessary to introduce a 
sound approximation for the risk-free rate as a basis for interest rates. Following the 
majority of studies in the field of finance in general, the first attempt was to use the 
US Treasury Bill rate for a short maturity of three month. Although the sample 
contains only European countries, government bonds today are of interest mostly for 
international institutional investors. This fact would have allowed for taking the US T-
Bill rate as a key interest rate. However, when comparing this rate with interest rates 
of government bonds within the EU, it came out that the T-Bill rate was well above 
other securities. Especially in the period from 2008, when markets became more 
volatile because of the financial crisis, the T-Bill failed in serving as a base rate. If 
one again considers the structure of interest rates for government bonds, this would 
have led to wrong estimations. A base rate above the interest rate for government 
bonds would have forced the premium for credit risk to be negative. However, as the 
base rate is per definition risk-free, this would have been strictly against the 
assumptions of the model.  
 
As a second attempt, the key interest rate published by the European Central Bank 
(ECB) was considered. However, when analyzing this rate, one can observe a rather 
stable development with extremely low volatility, although data is available for daily 
frequency. Keeping the estimation procedure in mind, it becomes obvious that 
especially the OLS system leads to severe problems. For some cases, this interest 
rate was constant over the whole estimation window, which made it impossible to 
calculate estimators necessary for further testing. Moreover, a constant interest rate 
is obviously weak in explaining volatile rates of securities at all.  
 
Another alternative, often used for European studies, is to take the interest rate of 
German government bonds. The idea behind this procedure is that Germany clearly 
involves the smallest credit risk among EU member states. Although it is not 
completely risk-free, it is the best approximation and should therefore be just slightly 
above the risk-free rate. However, the interest rate from Eurostat was inappropriate, 
as a maturity of ten years would have caused a bigger difference to the risk-free rate. 
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Finally, daily values for German government bonds with a remaining maturity of just 
one year served as a base rate. The data was published by Deutsche Bundesbank, 
again on a daily basis and as return per annum. This method does not produce 
biased results, as Germany did actually not face a rating change in the sample 
period. For this special case, results would have been questionable as a ten year 
government bonds surely is dependent to some degree on the one year government 
bond of the same sovereign.  
 
The development of German government bonds with a remaining maturity of one 
year is given in the following graph.  
 
 






Expectations and Hypotheses 
 
 
To measure the impact of rating announcements on the interest rate level of 
government bonds, abnormal rates in the event window are of main interest. Due to 
the relative short period of the event window, significant abnormal rates can be 
directly connected to the rating announcement. As mentioned above, abnormal rates 
were calculated the same way for positive and negative announcements, to keep the 
intuitive sign of the absolute change in interest rates. For different values of AR, the 
following results can be statet: 
 
AR = 0 (or insignificant): In this case, the rating announcement has absolutely no 
effect on securities. Of course, the AR can also be just too weak to allow for 
interpretation. This result would mean that CRAs add nothing to public information at 
all. As securities do not react, the information revealed by the announcement has 
already been available in the market. Even the argument that new information was 
not significant is obsolete here, as insignificant information would not have led to a 
rating change at all. However, with this result it remains unclear, whether CRAs add 
no new information, or investors do simply not believe in it. However, for both 
arguments CRAs would fail in their role as information intermediaries. In fact, they 
would not contribute in making financial markets more efficient in informational terms.  
 
AR < 0: Negative AR are obtained when the estimated NR are bigger than the actual 
observed values. This means that the rating announcement has had a positive 
impact from the perspective of the country. Interest rates decreased significantly after 
the event. In case of a positive rating announcement, negative ARs would be 
intuitive. Investors would value the rating change and securities react immediately. 
This is due to the fact that the rating announcement reveals new information about 
the sovereign. This information is not apparent in ex-ante interest rates, which 
causes them to shift accordingly. Finally, this result would indicate that CRAs have a 
significant impact and that investors do trust in their judgments. In contrast to zero 
ARs, CRAs would well serve as information intermediaries and actively contribute in 




AR > 0: Positive ARs can be interpreted as the opposite of negative ones. Again, the 
impact would be significant and observable. However, this is only true for negative 
announcements. If positive ARs are observed after positive rating announcements, 
this would be against theory. Good information about the sovereign would lead to an 
increase in interest rates, although the general interest rate level is taken into 
account. Indeed, this result would leave empirical tests questionable, even if ARs are 
technically significant.  
 
Therefore, there are two hypotheses for every group of rating announcements: 
 
 
H0:  = 0 (rating announcements have no impact) 
H1:   ≠ 0 (rating announcements have significant impact) 
 
 
This procedure is then repeated for actual rating changes and “On Watch” 
announcements. Furthermore, a distinction is made upon the levels of rating 
changes. The sample is therefore divided in two groups. The first group suffered a 
rating change over just one rating symbol, whereas the second group was graded 
through several symbols at once. Theory suggests that worse information should 
lead to stronger reactions in securities. The underlying hypotheses are given as: 
 
 
H0:                      
H1:                      
 
 
Typically, event studies on rating announcements usually test for further differences 
in reactions.48 These tests include distinctions between investment grade and 
speculative grade issuers, for example. However, this study consists only of 
sovereign government bonds, which were mostly rated as investment grade. Out of 
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101 events, only 14 were connected to speculative grade rated issuers. This would 
have lead to unrepresentative groups, as the number of observations per rating 
action decreases to a handful. Interpretations on the basis of such a small number of 
observations would have been rather questionable. Finally, a distinction according to 
the date of the announcement was also considered in the early stages of this study. 
Unfortunately, the majority of announcements took place after the beginning of the 
financial crisis. Before, sovereign ratings were rather stable with only few 
announcements observable. Therefore, a distinction upon date would have led to 







This section now provides empirical results and interpretations. The empirical tests 
described before were applied for all rating groups, including downgrades, upgrades 
and “On Watch” announcements. Moreover, groups were built consisting of all 
positive announcements and all negative announcements. The following table shows 
test results for each group. For each group, the number of included observations is 
given, which results in a total of 101 rating actions. Second, the mean of each group 
shows the average AR for that group. The results of two-sided t-tests are given below 
each mean value. Furthermore, the standard deviation gives a picture of sample 
variation in each group.  
 
 




Results show a clear impact of negative announcements. An actual negative change 
of a sovereign credit rating caused interest rates to rise by 0,6296 percentage points, 
on average. The announcement of a possible downgrade in the future, however, is 
even more powerful. A negative “On Watch” announcement causes an increase of 
0,6450, on average. Although standard deviation is higher for downgrades than for 
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upgrades, the results are highly significant at a 0,01 level. In this sense, empirical 
results are well supporting what theory suggests. Negative announcements trigger an 
immediate positive reaction in interest rates. Here, H0 of a zero mean for that group 
can clearly be rejected. According to the efficient market model, it can be said that 
CRAs do add new, significant information to public. Furthermore, this information is 
valued by investors, as prices for securities, or interest rates in this case, directly 
react. Ultimately, the published credit rating revealed some information that has not 
been available in the current set of information.  
 
Compared to other studies, the results are perfectly consistent as well. Cantor and 
Pecker (1998) came to the same conclusions, even if their results were not as 
significant as these. However, given that other studies were mostly carried out before 
financial crisis, one can state that the influence of CRAs has not diminished. In fact, 
their opinion seems to be even more valued. This might find its reason in investors, 
believing in superior assessment capabilities. As theory already suggests, market 
participants do not necessarily have to agree about the consequences of new 
information. It is perfectly sufficient for efficient markets, if some participants, in this 
case CRAs, provide more sophisticated estimations, which are then used as basis for 
expectations of other investors.  
 
The fact that an advance notice of a possible downgrade affects interest rates as well 
is no surprise at all. In approximately ten years of sample period, each and every 
advance notice was actually followed by an actual downgrade within less than half a 
year. As mentioned above, investors are using ex-post statistics to assess the quality 
of a current rating. In this sense, analysis of ex-post data suggests a 100 per cent 
probability that an “On Watch” announcement will be followed by a change in the 
given direction. However, not every downgrade is announced in advance. This is the 
reason why there is an observable reaction for both actions. The total shift in interest 
rates should therefore not be interpreted as the sum of both events.  
 
Upgrades on the other hand, show somewhat different results. First of all, although 
standard deviation is smaller in this group, results are not as significant as for 
downgrades. Nevertheless, a significance level of 5 % still allows for interpretations, 
at least for actual upgrades. The first important difference is that the impact of 
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positive announcements seems to be much smaller compared to downgrades. On 
average, an upgrade of a sovereign credit rating causes interest rates to decrease by 
only 0,2004 percentage points. So, market participants do value changes in both 
directions. This ultimately supports the idea that CRAs contribute to higher market 
efficiency in financial markets. Based on these results, they successfully serve as 
information intermediaries. However, the reason why positive announcements have a 
smaller impact on interest rates remains unclear. One might state that investors are 
suspicious about positive news in times of crises and very volatile markets. However, 
a clear statement cannot be given on the basis of this study, which invites further 
investigation.  
 
However, with respect to the currently increasing interest on CRAs, their role seems 
to be proven by this study. Downgrades by CRAs are clearly followed by higher 
interest rates for government bonds, which makes public financing more expensive in 
future. Given that a downgraded sovereign already faces restrictions in public finance 
for any reason, the downgrade itself further fuels these difficulties. Accordingly, a 
negative rating announcement at least can represent a dangerous threat.  
 
Furthermore, it is of interest how interest rates react in time. The following graph 
includes average ARs for downgrades and upgrades. Due to less meaningful results 
for “On Watch” upgrades, these announcements were not included. This picture 
sums up the important characteristics of the impact of rating actions. The horizontal 
axis represents time in days, with t = 0 as the day of the event. For downgrades, the 
impact is most powerful on the day of the event, visible by the highest slope of the 
graph over the event window. Moreover, although the impact on the event day is 
quite impressive, it is still followed by a slight upward movement in the post event 
period. All in all, the change in interest rates is much higher and the development 
steeper compared to upgrades. Here it becomes visible, that rating actions seem to 
be anticipated as well. For downgrades, the impact already starts one day before the 
event, while for upgrades a clear decrease already happens three days before. In 
fact, for upgrades, the impact of anticipation is even stronger than on the event day. 
Next, beginning four days after the event, upgrades seem to remain stable at a 
certain level, whereas downgrades remain slightly increasing until the end of the 
event window.  
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For both categories, a simple linear trend line was added to show a more smooth 
movement through the event window. This line can be compared to the average 
movement on the event day. For downgrades, it shows a clear difference with 
respect to the slope of the lines. This represents a much higher impact on the event 
day compared with the whole event window. In contrast, the slope for upgrades is 
very similar, representing a smooth reaction in prices throughout the whole event 
window. In the latter case, the biggest difference can be spotted three days before 











Finally, the sample was spread in downgrades over one level and those over multiple 
levels at once. As the latter seem to represent worse information, one would also 
expect a stronger impact on interest rates, therefore. And this expectation is perfectly 
supported by empirical results. 
 




The following graph also deals with this idea and plots the average impact for both 
groups over the event window. Here, multiple level downgrades show a much higher 
impact, resulting in an increase in interest rates of more than one percentage point at 
the end of the event window. In contrast, one level downgrades show an impact of 
about the half magnitude. Especially on the day of the event, the slope of multiple 
downgrades is approximately twice as big. Moreover, the smoothed impact over the 
event window, represented by the linear trend line is also clearly steeper for multiple 
downgrades. This shows that investors clearly value this additional information. 










As a bottom line, one can state that downgrades have a significantly higher impact 
on interest rates than upgrades. Especially a multiple downgrade can cause an 
increase in borrowing costs of nearly 1 %. Given the immense amounts of 
outstanding debt instruments of sovereigns, a 1 % shift means a dramatic burden for 
public finance. The results support the argument, that credit ratings can become a 
serious threat for sovereigns. As a consequence, a later section of this study will deal 




Further Evidence from Credit Default Swaps  
 
 
Although the obtained results are promising and in accordance with other studies in 
this field, a potential influence from other factors has not been tested yet. Therefore, 
the following chapter will investigate the role of credit default swaps in detail. At least 
for downgrades, CRAs obviously have an influence on government bonds returns. 
However, it is possible that both, credit ratings and bond returns are actually more 
determined by credit default swap spreads. If this is the case, then CRAs would not 
add new information but rather react to movements in CDS markets. This would 
mean that new information is first processed there and causes adjustments in 
sovereign credit ratings. However, before this aspect is tested empirically, this 
section of the paper contains a short introduction on the function and market of credit 
default swaps.  
 
 
Credit Default Swaps 
 
 
Credit Default Swaps are increasingly important instruments in the group of credit 
derivatives. While trading of these securities was quite rare in the 1990’s, the market 
reached $ 20 trillion in 2006, which represents an immense growth.49 The most 
important contract among those securities is the single-entity CDS, making up about 
one third of total trading. Basically, CDS can be seen as an insurance mechanism 
against default risk of an entity. This entity can either be a corporate or sovereign 
issuer of financial securities subject to default risk. The two parties involved in such a 
contract are typically referred to as protection seller and protection buyer.50 The 
buyer pays a regular fee to the seller for obtaining the right to sell a particular bond at 
its face value in case of a credit event. This allows market participants to trade the 
default risk inherent in government or corporate bonds separately on the market.51 
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The credit event acting as a trigger is of course specified in the contract and can 
include some or all of the following points, as listed by Blanco et al. (2005):  
 
 Bankruptcy 
 Failure to pay 
 Obligation default or acceleration 
 Repudiation or moratorium (for sovereign entities) 
 Restructuring 
 
The compensation for protection against default is based on the CDS premium, or 
the CDS spread. As the buyer is able to sell the bond at its face value, the seller 
takes the risk of losing the difference between this face value and the market value of 
the bond after default.52  
 
The annual payment is given by CDS spreads, which are determined in basis points. 
One can think of an example of a $ 10 million corporate bond issued by the reference 
entity. If the spread currently is at 300 basis points, the protection buyer has to pay $ 
300 000. The buyer then has the right to sell the bond exactly for $ 10 million in case 
of a credit event.53  
 
 
Data and Sample 
 
 
The sample for this investigation again includes the current 27 member states of the 
European Union. After eliminating those countries which did not face a negative 
rating action, 11 sovereigns were left. Due to data availability, it ranges from 
December 14th 2007 to February 29th 2012. Datastream does not provide a longer 
history of data. The time series contained 5-year CDS spreads as explained before, 
given in basis points in daily frequency.  
 
For rating actions, on the other hand, only those within this time period were 
included. The number of announcements is given in the following table. As data 
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availability is exactly equal for all sovereigns, all announcements have been included 
this time.  
 




Descriptive statistics for CDS-spreads is given in the following table. Interesting is 
that mean values are well above median values for all countries within the sample. 
This already shows that there must be considerable peaks, even without any 
graphical analysis. However, what really stands out is the incredible maximum of 
CDS-Spreads of Greece, with a value of nearly 15 000 basis points. This perfectly 
illustrates the dramatic development of the Hellenic economy. But, although Greece 
is the absolute leader here, all others show relatively high values as well. On the 
other hand, this should not be surprising, as the sample only includes sovereigns 
facing negative rating actions.  
 
The graph then shows the development of CDS-spreads over time. The two lines 
represent the mean and the median of the whole group of sovereigns included. The 
first interesting shift happens in September 2008. This was caused by the financial 
crisis, which also heavily affected sovereigns. After that, spreads recovered on 
average until October 2009. From that point on, they steadily increased before they 
explode in April 2011. This dramatic shift can be interpreted as the beginning of the 
impact of the sovereign debt crisis. Although most of the spreads increased from that 
point on, Greece is heavily affecting the mean value, which explains the huge 

































































The bottom line here is that countries which suffered negative rating actions clearly 
show increased CDS spreads. However, until now it is unclear which one causes the 
other variable, or if there is at least any interdependence.  
 
 
Empirical Testing and Results 
 
 
The empirical methodology used for further investigation is a standard Granger 
causality test (Granger, 1969). Generally, the model investigates two time series Xt, 
Yt, in the form of: 
 
                          
 
   
 




                          
 
   
 
   
 
 
In economic terms, the model tests whether past values of Y can help to predict 
current values of X better than past values of X exclusively, and vice versa. Coming 
back to the model, a causal relationship is proven if b (or d, respectively) is not 
zero.54 However, an important requirement for the application of this test is stationary 
time series.55 This requirement is not fulfilled yet. For this study, X will represent 
rating actions whereas Y represents values for sovereign CDS-spreads. The problem 
for rating actions is that they have to be transformed into a quantitative scale. Rating 
actions were therefore introduced as a dummy variable. It takes the value of 1, if a 
rating action occurs at time t, and remains zero elsewhere. By conducting two 
Granger causality test it was possible to distinguish actual downgrades and negative 
ON WATCH announcements.  
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CDS-spreads for sovereigns already were metric. However, as one can see in the 
prior graph, they are far away from being stationary. To overcome this problem and 
meet the requirements of the empirical tests, the values for Y are given as: 
 
                      
 
where s represents the CDS-spread in basis points. The first differences were used 
to generate a stationary series whereas a logarithmic function reduced variations in 
scale of the two time series. The problem before was that the dummy variable shifted 
from zero to one while fluctuations in CDS-spreads were much higher.  
 
After generating the necessary time series, a vector auto-regression (VAR) model 
was applied. This was done to obtain more information about the lag structure in the 
model. Then, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test statistic at a 5 % level was used as an 
indicator for the optimal lag length for the following Granger causality tests. This 
method identified the optimal lag length from a maximum of 30, as the study uses 
daily data. Finally, Granger tests have been conducted for this number of lags 
included.  
 
However, the results are not as clear as before. The following table provides values 
for F-test statistics of pairwise Granger causality tests for each sovereign. The total 
number of 41 downgrades is spread over 13 countries, whereas 20 ON WATCH 
announcements correspond to 10 sovereigns. This is simply due to the fact that not 
every downgrade is announced in advance. The columns represent results for each 




































The following graph provides a better overview for both groups. It first shows that it 
was not possible to identify a causal relationship between credit ratings and CDS 
spreads for the majority of included countries. The reason for this remains unclear, 
but one should not forget that credit default swaps are driven by numerous factors 
that are not part of the model. It is therefore not surprising, that sovereign credit 
ratings are relatively weak in explaining spreads. However, what is interesting is the 
distribution between the two groups. For announcements of downgrades, it seems 
that, if at all, credit ratings help predicting CDS spreads. This causal relationship has 
not been proven for even one country in case of actual downgrades. Those, on the 
other hand, show significant results in the other direction or feedback relations.  
 
The remaining question is now what this tells in economic terms. Starting with ON 
WATCH announcements, there is weak significance of results. Due to this fact, it is 
not possible to state that those announcements have a direct influence on CDS 
spreads. However, if there is a significant relation, credit ratings lead CDS spreads. 
Anticipation can therefore be neglected. In this sense, CDS spreads might follow or 
not, but never the other way round.  
 
The picture is completely different for actual downgrades. Here, one can only spot 
CDS spreads leading credit ratings, or even a feedback situation. And this result is 
not surprising at all. As mentioned before, not every downgrade is announced in 
advance. However, each and every announcement is followed by a downgrade within 
the following 6 month. What happens here is that CDS spreads react to the 
announcement, and, by doing so, “predict” the actual downgrade. But, the fact that 
not every downgrade is announced before explains the larger share of feedback 
relations. This simply represents sovereigns where both, unexpected and expected 
downgrades, occurred.  
 
As a bottom line, results are relatively weak, and do not allow for interpreting clear 
lead-lag patterns. However, full anticipation of credit rating actions in the CDS market 
can be rejected. Especially negative announcements lead CDS spreads, although 
numerous other factors would be necessary to predict them successfully. 
Downgrades, on the other hand, are anticipated by the market. But this finds its 
reason in the ex-post probability of a downgrade following a negative announcement, 
62 
 
which is, of course, observed by the market. The empirical study of CDS spreads 
therefore further strengthens the previous results. As credit ratings and CDS spreads 
depend in a way on the same thing, full anticipation would have ruined the role of 
CRAs. In this case, they would again only collect information which is already 
reflected in financial markets. These results now further prove that they really add 











Reducing the Impact of Credit Rating Agencies 
 
 
As seen in empirical tests of this and other studies, CRA do have a significant impact 
on borrowing costs of sovereigns. In a way, they might actually start a downward 
spiral for shattered economies. As a result of a negative situation of public finance, 
rating agencies set the rating symbol to a lower level, revealing higher default risk. As 
a consequence, borrowing costs increase, as investors expect higher interest rates 
for holding more risky securities. Ultimately, increased borrowing costs mean a 
further burden on the budget, resulting in a downgrade once again. This effect 
explains some of the downgrade series for weak economies like Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland or Greece. However, as other member states are meant to help out, they also 
have an incentive to limit the power of rating agencies, especially on sovereigns. The 
recent introduction of EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) and ESM 
(European Stability Mechanism) perfectly shows the problems arising when individual 
members need help by joint rescue packages.  
 
It must be noted here that CRAs are of course not exclusively responsible for the 
economic situation of some sovereigns here. The effect of interest is that they seem 
to further fuel an adverse development. Especially downgrades have an undesirable 
signal effect on financial markets while politicians try to blandish.  
 
Accordingly, opinions became louder paying attention to overcoming the powerful 
impact of CRAs. The last chapter of this study will therefore analyze measures of the 
EU on this behalf, again with special emphasize on sovereign credit ratings and on 
the basis of obtained results on informational value. The measures against adverse 
power of credit rating agencies can basically be divided in two groups. The first one 
aims at regulating CRAs in order to eliminate the amplifying effect of sovereign credit 
ratings as mentioned before. In contrast, the second proposes the foundation of a 
European rating agency which mainly refers to questionable market conditions in the 










A prevalent criticism of CRAs is their lack of accountability for published credit 
ratings.56 This criticism seems to be shared by EU institutions, insisting on legal 
responsibility of CRAs for wrong ratings. This basically means that investors, relying 
on the opinion of CRAs would be able to sue agencies, if they suffer losses caused 
by defaults of well rated entities. However, this approach does not seem to be 
realistic. As noted in a legal disclaimer in literally all publications of CRAs, credit 
ratings are meant to be opinions about the future probability of the issuer to repay 
debt obligations.  
 
They insist on clarifying that ratings are no suggestions to buy, sell or hold any 
financial security.57 In this sense, rating agencies see themselves more in a role 
similar to financial journalists. Especially in court, their publications are protected by 
the constitution of free speech. CRAs have therefore not lost one single court case.58 
Furthermore, credit ratings are not produced for single investors. As mentioned 
above, rating activities are typically, if at all, paid by sovereigns, leading to an 
absence of any contractual agreement between an individual investors and the CRA.  
 
All these facts have in past successfully protected CRAs from litigation. Furthermore, 
the need for governmental regulation in this case seems more than questionable. A 
common argument by officials of CRAs proposes to rely on market mechanisms 
instead. If agencies repeatedly publish inappropriate ratings, market participants 
would take notice fast.59 If a significant number of well rated issuers were not able to 
repay their debt obligations, the quality of current credit ratings will be questioned by 
investors. If rating quality does not convince investors, issuers, as a consequence, 
will not be willing to pay for rating activities anymore. The result of low quality would 
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be no reaction of rating announcements, as investors no longer rely on the opinions 
of CRAs. As rating activities represent the bulk of profits, their business model would 
simply break down. In the eyes of CRAs, the market mechanism is therefore much 
more efficient than any government body. Furthermore, for litigation, the required 
common legal basis is still missing. As long as CRAs classify their ratings as opinion 





Ban Sovereign Ratings 
 
 
Another proposed countermeasure against the increasing power of CRAs is to ban 
their ratings for sovereigns from European financial markets.60 For this purpose, two 
ways are possible in theory. First, credit ratings could be regulated based on their 
time of publication. In this sense, European institutions would prohibit rating changes 
for certain periods. The second and even more radical attempt would be a complete 
prohibition of sovereign credit ratings in the EU. Although these approaches do not 
seem feasible at all, they were presented in debates of the EP and are therefore 
discussed here for the sake of completeness. However, these actions do not have 
realistic chances at all, as even other MEPs had serious doubts about that.61  
 
Again, it is the issuer that pays for rating actions, while assigned ratings are available 
free of charge. To think that European investors can successfully be discouraged to 
check these ratings is strict nonsense. Furthermore, a timely regulation of rating 
changes would in fact ruin the raison d’être of CRAs. If they are not allowed to 
provide timely information about financial securities, their role as information 
intermediaries would be senseless. This approach is therefore not only impossible, 
but also dangerous. The goal of any regulation of CRAs should be to increase 
information efficiency in financial markets. On this behalf it is necessary to use credit 
ratings carefully, which is only possible if a sound balance of control and market 
efficiency can be found.62 As CRAs are currently contributing in making financial 
markets more efficient by reducing principal-agent problems inherent in every credit 
relation, too much regulation or even a ban would only make markets more opaque. 
As a result, financial markets would be even more nervous and volatile, which can in 
neither case be the goal of any European body.  
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Another, more promising action to reduce the impact of CRAs is to reduce 
dependence on credit ratings of market participants.63 In contrast to other arguments, 
this approach would in fact mean to reduce regulation instead of increasing it. The 
idea behind this is that current regulation with respect to credit ratings is itself 
intensifying the impact of rating changes. As mentioned before, several governments 
use credit ratings as a way to regulate investments of public funds, e.g. pension 
funds.64 Those funds are only allowed to invest in securities currently holding a 
certain minimum credit rating. The aim of this regulation is that these funds should 
not invest in high risk securities. However, this ultimately means that in case of a 
downgrade, they are forced to sell those securities. In case of a downgrade of a 
sovereign credit rating, the amplifying effect of this legal framework becomes 
obvious.65  
 
As mentioned before, the downgrade directly increases borrowing costs, which 
further stresses the budget. Moreover, especially institutional, regulated investors are 
not allowed to invest anymore, resulting in immense sales. In fact, this procedure 
further boosts the negative effect of a downgrade. Second, it generates over-reliance 
on external ratings. If legal frameworks are strictly based on external ratings, there is 
absolutely no incentive to rely on internal evaluations of the underlying credit risk. 
Consequently, the downgrade provokes a “mechanic” reaction, even if investors do 
not agree with CRA’s opinions.  
 
Indeed, this is just another case where market efficiency is reduced in favor of 
control. In contrast, a pure market mechanism could prevent this by leaving the 
decision to investors. In this sense, investors could hold securities if they are 
downgraded, if their assessment produces contradicting results. Although it is 
unclear, whether investors would prefer their own evaluations, this provides at least a 
chance to prevent the amplifying effect.  
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Another important aspect with respect to regulation is the Basel framework published 
by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision.66 This framework introduced capital 
requirements according to the underlying credit risk. To assess this risk, the use of 
external credit ratings was supposed to make most sense. The framework introduced 
so-called ECAIs. These institutions are subject to certain criteria explained later in 
this chapter. Indeed, this situation is very similar to the first example. Of course, 
banks hold considerable amounts in sovereign debt securities like government 
bonds. If these securities are downgraded, the capital requirements increase 
accordingly.  
 
Again, the additional capital requirements bare the incentive to reduce investments in 
those bonds, as additional capital cannot be raised easily. Legal frameworks for 
banks therefore act the same way as regulation for mutual funds before. If capital 
requirements are solely bound on external credit ratings, there is again a “mechanic” 
reaction.67 In this case, the Basel Committee has already reacted. For the next phase 
of the framework, Basel III, several articles have been changed in order to overcome 
over-reliance on external ratings.68 Instead of picking the best available credit ratings 
from all CRAs, banks must consistently use one CRA for each group of securities.  
 
Furthermore, banks have to increase their internal capabilities for credit risk 
assessment. Of course, the idea is to prevent automatic reactions based on opinions 
of ECAIs (External Credit Assessment Institutions). Moreover, the requirements to 
become such an ECAI have been revised as well. CRAs have to meet certain criteria 
concerning independence, transparency, objectivity, credibility and disclosure 
requirements.69 Only if these requirements are fulfilled, credit ratings of this entity can 
be used for risk assessment. In comparison with other countermeasures, this aspect 
seems to have the most promising chances in reducing the impact of credit ratings 
on sovereign bonds. This approach considers the usage of credit ratings rather than 
their creation. The important difference is the absence of direct regulation. As 
mentioned before, an elaboration of rules for CRAs seems unrealistic. European 
institutions will not be able to dictate US rating agencies.  
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However, how these credit ratings are used within the EU is of course part of 
European legislation and frameworks. In this sense, this approach has much more 
chances for application. Furthermore it shows that regulation can easily result in 
contrary effects. While reliance for regulated entities was meant to decrease risk, it 
created an opposite effect for borrowers. In fact, more regulation seems to 








However, strict reliance on markets should not be the bottom line here. Especially the 
weak performance of CRAs with respect to mortgage-backed securities showed that 
there are some problems inherent.70 While earlier misestimation of rating agencies 
mainly concerned single entities, like Enron, as the most prominent case, failures for 
whole types of securities followed later.71 A series of harsh downgrades in structured 
finance products and mortgage-backed securities clearly showed initial estimation 
problems. However, as especially structured finance products were increasingly 
complex while at the same time in high demand, investors completely relied on 
opinions of CRAs. In fact, neither investors nor regulators had sufficient overview on 
rating methodologies for these products.72 Finally, before the breakdown of the 
market it seemed that investors had practically lost understanding of the structure of 
those securities. However, they were still actively traded as long as they held an 
investment grade credit rating.73 The breakdown then caused not only heavy losses 
fully bared by investors but also a collapse of the market. Moreover, regulators have 
done nothing to prevent this during the growth of this segment.74 The answer of 
regulators then was to increase transparency in the credit rating industry.  
 
Basically, the need for higher transparency affects CRAs at different levels. First, 
rating methodologies should be published in detail.75 This means that rating agencies 
have to present all evaluations conducted to assign a current credit rating. In case of 
sovereign ratings, results for all factors explained above should be available to 
investors. Although rating agencies do publish the methodologies, this goal is not yet 
reached. Only the specific weights that are assigned to each factor would allow for 
traceability of credit ratings. This information is not published at the moment. 
Furthermore, it is of interest whether the issuer has participated in assigning the 
rating or not, to identify conflicts of interest.  
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Another concern on this behalf is the availability of compensation models.76 In this 
sense, CRAs should publish who has paid how much and when for a current credit 
rating. Again, this aspect aims at reducing problems arising from conflicts of interest. 
However, it is of less interest in case of sovereign credit ratings. As those ratings are 
used for numerous internal purposes, sovereign ratings are typically assigned free of 
charge, at least for industrial countries. This aspect can therefore be neglected here.  
 
The last point for increasing transparency in the rating industry deals with past 
performance of assigned ratings. According to this, CRAs should publish past ratings 
in combination with default series. Based on this data, ESMA shall be able to assess 
rating quality more easily.77 Rating errors should furthermore be available to all 
investors free of charge. The idea behind is that investors should not take credit 
ratings as infallible. If market participants realize that errors occur, the reaction to 
rating changes would be limited as well. In a way, this point also supports the aspect 
of reducing over-reliance. Furthermore, the actual observed number of defaults in 
every rating category should be published as well.78 This would allow assigning 
absolute default probabilities for each category, instead of relative expressions 
available now.  
 
All these requirements basically aim at providing more information to regulators and 
investors. As a consequence, investors would be able to do more sophisticated 
analysis of past rating performance, which results in better evaluation of current 
rating quality. At the same time, regulators would have more insight in rating 
methodologies and procedures. Especially if external credit ratings are used for other 
regulated entities, this is essential. Only if these methodologies are known in detail, 
the adequacy for other purposes can be determined correctly. As mentioned above, 
transparency requirements can easily be introduced by regulation frameworks. If 
CRAs do not fulfill them, they will not be accepted as providers of external credit 
ratings with respect to these frameworks, such as Basel III. By doing so, even 
European institutions can successfully introduce new guidelines for CRAs, as they 
would lose a considerable number of customers otherwise.  
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Foundation of a European Credit Rating Agency 
 
 
The fact that several regulation approaches cannot be realized due to a missing legal 
basis proposed the idea of founding a European CRA.79 The following chapter will 
therefore analyze the chances of a new European agency in international financial 
markets. Basically, the motivations are very similar to the above mentioned points. 
First, a European agency could be regulated more effective, compared to US CRAs. 
This includes transparency and over-reliance, but also conflicts of interest. 
Ownership structure and interest held by the agency could be dictated by European 
institutions. Furthermore, a new CRA would mean a new player in the industry. A 
prevalent argument for the foundation of a European opponent has therefore been a 
permanent elimination of the lack of competition in this industry. The last point of this 
study will now analyze whether a European agency would have significant chances 
to meet these expectations.  
 
First, a common view is that a European agency would overcome the adverse 
ownership structure of the US agencies. This aspect basically deals with conflicts of 
interest if rated entities are part of the board of the CRA. And for corporate issuers 
this argument might be meaningful. However, it is obvious that a European agency 
would bare the same risk in case of sovereign ratings. In this case, the EU would 
have a strong incentive to keep credit ratings high, although economic circumstances 
would not allow doing so. In a sense, a European body would be able to directly 
influence borrowing costs of a sovereign. For the special case of sovereign credit 
ratings this aspect is not really meaningful at all.  
 
Another potential advantage is higher transparency of rating procedures. Indeed, as 
European institutions could set legal requirements on this behalf, transparency could 
be increased easily. However, it is likely that US CRAs would follow, once the 
European agency has been developed. As quality and transparency are important 
factors regarding competition in this industry, US opponents would not be willing to 
lose customers to this new entrant.  
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However, before analyzing potential advantages of a European agency, it is 
necessary to assess its chances on the market. What will it offer to investors to 
overcome the immense market power of the two currently dominating agencies?  
 
First of all, the credit rating industry is characterized by considerable entry barriers. 
As mentioned in the first section of this paper, existing CRAs look back on a very 
successful history. The fact, that investors rely heavily on their opinion is based on 
past performance. Indeed, a new entrant could not provide such a track of success, 
which makes it impossible for investors to assess the quality of currently assigned 
credit ratings. The next shortcoming concerns the coverage of financial securities. As 
the dominant CRAs were founded over 100 years ago, their coverage ratios are quite 
impressive today. Overall, they serve well over 90 % of bonds and stocks in 
developed countries, and the vast majority in emerging markets. It is simply 
impossible for a new entrant to keep up with this. All these arguments lead to the 
conclusion that investors would not rely on the opinions of a European CRA. Even if 
transparency requirements are higher, the experience of S&P and Moody’s will still 
convince them. Furthermore, in the special case of sovereign credit ratings, the 
conflict of interest is inherent if a European institution controls the CRA, and this 
would definitely be the case. In presentations of the EP, the European CRA is 
repeatedly mentioned as public institution.80 According to this, the market chances for 
a European rating agency diminish considerably.  
 
Finally, going one step back, even a successful market entry seems more than 
venture. Although there are basically three relevant CRAs worldwide, this does of 
course not mean that there are no other players in the market. In fact, there are 
numerous smaller rating agencies, highly specialized in securities’ or geographical 
terms.81 A common answer of regulators is that the European agency would directly 
be accepted as external credit assessment institution (ECAI) within the Basel III 
framework. However, several authors already found out, that this is not of interest. 
New entrants do typically not fail due to a lack of governmental acceptance. Instead, 
it is market acceptance that prevents new entrants from growing considerably.82  
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 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 6) 
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 cf. Katz et al. (2009, p. 6) 
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As a bottom line, it seems that European officials seem to overvalue the opportunities 
of a European CRA dramatically. Although the dominant rating agencies do have 
some problems, it is just presumptuous to think that a European body could 
outperform them from the beginning. Taking all factors into consideration, it seems 
rather senseless to found a new rating agency. Nevertheless, even if it would find the 
necessary market acceptance over time, this can only be done by providing high 
quality credit ratings. It would take years to keep up with the reputational capital of 
S&P or Moody’s, developed over decades. Finally, as rating quality has to stay high 
for business success, sovereign ratings would be at least very similar if not identical 
to the US ones. Ultimately, a European CRA could not publish favorable credit 
ratings for the same reasons why US CRAs cannot. Otherwise it would risk its 
reputational capital and ruin its business model. Finally, the fact that one CRA has a 
European origin would add no advantage in case of severe difficulties in public 
finance of a member state. Rating actions in favor of this sovereign would happen 
only once before investors lose confidence.  
 
Based on these specifications, it seems much more promising to rethink the usage of 
credit ratings, instead of creating a competitor. Especially with respect to sovereign 







This paper aimed at investigating the impact of sovereign rating announcements on 
the level of interest rates of government bonds. After summing up the important 
aspects of existing literature, an empirical study was conducted in the form of an 
event study. Theory already suggested an important role of CRAs, basically triggered 
by two important facts. First, the efficient market model suggests that relevant new 
information is immediately incorporated in security prices. According to this idea, the 
opinion of CRAs should have a significant impact on interest rates. In this sense, 
CRAs would act as information intermediaries, providing new information to other 
market participants. By doing so, they would actively contribute in making markets 
more efficient. However, the question remained whether they really add new 
information, or just sum up macroeconomic fundamentals, that were already 
contained in the currently available information set.  
 
Secondly, investors would have to value the opinion of CRAs. Otherwise, CRAs 
would publish rating announcements, but prices would not react as investors do 
simply not believe in their assessments. However, especially the aspect of 
reputational capital strictly contradicts this idea. According to this theory, CRAs are 
reluctant to save costs by insufficient analysis. Furthermore, a favorable credit rating 
would not generate enough additional profit in order to exceed the upcoming losses 
caused by a loss in confidence. As investors estimate the quality of a current rating 
on basis of ex-post analysis, only CRAs with outstanding past performance are able 
to generate higher margins for their services. Furthermore, these high quality 
agencies are more attractive for new issuers, willing to win as much international 
investors as possible. Ultimately, low quality service is not an option and would lead 
to market exit, sooner or later.  
 
To investigate the impact of rating actions, an event study was conducted. The 
results clearly support the introducing theoretical approach. Except of possible 
upgrades, all rating actions show significant impact on interest rates of government 
bonds. Negative announcements overall have a much higher impact as well. Over 
time, the average movement is highest on the event day for downgrades. In contrast, 
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a dominant change can be spotted three days before the event in case of an 
upgrade, which shows anticipation of the rating action. Furthermore, although all 
negative “On Watch” movements led to a real downgrade later, the impact indicates 
two steps of similar magnitude. This is due to the reason that not every downgrade is 
announced in advance. And, although the same is true for advance notices of 
possible upgrades, there is no significant impact for those announcements. And even 
further analysis of credit default swap spreads supports the results. Granger causality 
tests could not identify any evidence of anticipation of negative announcements. 
Finally, empirical tests clearly support the important role of CRAs nowadays. They 
are highly valued information intermediaries with superior assessment capabilities. 
This somehow justifies the increased notice of those agencies in academic literature 
as well as politics and press. Especially for sovereigns already facing severe 
difficulties, a negative rating announcement can further heat up the situation. It is 
therefore of central interest, to keep sovereign credit ratings as high as possible, in 
order to prevent dramatic increases in costs for debt financing.  
 
Finally, overcoming this impact is a challenging task for global regulators. While 
CRAs have a position as de facto gatekeepers of financial markets, they still refuse 
to take responsibility for unjustified ratings. Furthermore, a common legal basis to set 
strict frameworks is missing as well. At the moment, regulation can only be based on 
voluntary guidelines. However, the most promising opportunity seems to be a 
reduction of regulation, instead. Only if legal requirements prevent an automatic 
reliance on external ratings, the impact of credit ratings can be weakened. Moreover, 
these requirements concerning the usage of external ratings can easily be introduced 
throughout the EU. And it seems that the Basel III framework will already eliminate 
this “mechanic” reaction provoked by its previous version.  
 
Finally, less regulation leaves the opportunity for better market mechanisms, 
although supported by higher transparency of rating methodologies. The foundation 
of a European CRA on the other hand does not provide serious chances at all. The 
existence of numerous new entrants, all together irrelevant on the global market, 
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In dieser Studie werden die Auswirkungen von Änderungen im Kredirating auf 
Zinssätze von Anleihen europäischer Staaten untersucht. Zuerst wurde ein möglicher 
Einfluss auf der Basis von aktueller wissenschaftlicher Literatur zu diesem Thema 
erörtert. Anschließend wurde dieser Einfluss empirisch mit einer Eventanalyse 
überprüft. Die dafür verwendete Literatur ließ schon vor der Durchführung auf einen 
wesentlichen Einfluss der Rating Agenturen schließen. Dabei werden in mehreren 
Studien im Wesentlichen zwei Theorien hervorgehoben. Einerseits wird bei der 
Beurteilung des Marktes von Informationseffizenz ausgegangen. Dieser Ansatz geht 
davon aus, dass neue und wesentliche Information über den Emittenten sofort in den 
Preisen von Finanzprodukten abgebildet wird. Rating Agenturen übernehmen daher 
die Rolle von Informationsintermediären, die diese Information anderen 
Marktteilnehmern zur Verfügung stellen. Dadurch tragen sie zu einer erhöhten 
Informationseffizienz bei. Trotzdem bleibt die Frage offen, ob sie dabei wirklich neue 
Information anbieten, oder sämtliche Informationen bereits vor Veröffentlichung des 
Kreditratings schon bekannt waren.  
 
Außerdem müsste gewährleistet sein, dass Investoren auf die Meinung von 
Ratingagenturen vertrauen. Andernfalls würden die Zinssätze von Staatsanleihen 
nicht auf Veränderungen der Ratings reagieren, weil Investoren die Einschätzungen 
der Agenturen nicht teilen. Dem widerspricht jedoch der Aspekt des 
Reputationskapitals. Nach diesem Ansatz lehnen die Agenturen Kosteneinsparungen 
durch unzureichende Analyse strikt ab. Dasselbe gilt demnach für vom Emittenten 
beeinflusste Ratings, die nicht der Wahrheit entsprechen. Investoren können die 
Qualität von aktuellen Kreditratings nur anhand von historischen Daten überprüfen. 
Daher sind Agenturen, die überdurchschnittliche Qualität in der Vergangenheit 
vorweisen, in der Lage, zusätzliche Profite zu generieren. Da diese dann von 
Investoren bevorzugt werden, kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass auch 
Emittenten neuer Produkte ihre Dienste in Anspruch nehmen wollen, was wiederum 
zu neuen Aufträgen führt. Daraus ergibt sich, dass eine schlechte Qualität der 
veröffentlichten Ratings dauerhaft der Glaubwürdigkeit der Agentur schadet und 
somit den Fortbestand gefährden würde. Die zusätzlichen Profite durch beeinflusste 
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Ratings wären daher genauso wie Kosteneinsparungen durch unzureichende 
Analysen nicht ausreichend, um die erwarteten Verluste durch Einbußen in der 
Glaubwürdigkeit auszugleichen. Dieser Ansatz geht also davon aus, dass nur 
hochqualitative Kreditratings angeboten werden, um den langfristigen Erfolg der 
Agentur zu gewährleisten.  
 
Um diesen Einfluss nun entsprechend zu testen wurde eine Eventanalyse 
durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse belegen dabei die erwähnten, theoretischen 
Ableitungen basierend auf aktueller wissenschaftlicher Literatur. Mit Ausnahme der 
Ankündigungen von Aufstufungen des Kreditratings zeigten sämtliche 
Ratingmaßnahmen einen signifikanten Einfluss auf die Zinssätze der Staatsanleihen. 
Negative Veröffentlichungen verursachten dabei eine weitaus höhere Reaktion als 
positive. Über das gesamte Eventfenster ist der Einfluss von Abstufungen zudem am 
Tag der Veröffentlichung am stärksten ausgeprägt. Interessanterweise liegt dieses 
Maximum bei Aufstufungen bereits drei Tage vor der eigentlichen Veröffentlichung, 
was auf Erwartung der Investoren schließen lässt. Obwohl auf die Ankündigung einer 
Abstufung, sogenannte „On Watch“ Meldungen, in jedem Fall tatsächliche 
Änderungen folgen, verläuft der Einfluss trotzdem in zwei Stufen. Diese Reaktion ist 
im Durchschnitt auch von der absoluten Änderung ähnlich. Auch bei Aufstufungen 
wurden mögliche Änderungen ausnahmslos von tatsächlichen Änderungen in der 
angegebenen Richtung bestätigt, ein signifikanter Einfluss konnte dennoch nicht 
nachgewiesen werden. Die anschließende Analyse der CDS Spreads festigte diese 
Ergebnisse weiter. Granger-Kausalitätstests konnten hierbei keinen Hinweis auf 
bereits erwartete Ratingänderungen liefern. Die Informationen der Ratingagenturen 
sind also vor der Veröffentlichung auch in CDS Spreads noch nicht abgebildet.  
 
Insgesamt unterstützen die empirischen Ergebnisse aber die wichtige Rolle, die 
Ratingagenturen in modernen Finanzmärkten spielen. Sie stellen dabei wertvolle 
Informationsintermediäre dar, die über überlegene Analysefähigkeiten verfügen. In 
gewisser Weise rechtfertigt diese Rolle die erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit in Wissenschaft, 
Politik und Presse. Gerade wenn sich Staaten bereits in einer wirtschaftlich 
schwierigen Situation befinden, kann eine negative Veröffentlichung der 
Ratingagenturen zu einer weiteren Verschärfung der Situation beitragen. Es sollte 
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daher konsequent versucht werden, das Kreditrating so hoch wie möglich zu halten, 
um wesentliche Erhöhungen der Finanzierungkosten zu vermeiden.  
 
Letztlich stellt die Machtposition von Ratingagenturen auch Regulatoren vor eine 
neue und schwierige Aufgabe. Während diese nämlich den Zugang zu 
Finanzmärkten erheblich beeinflussen, lehnen sie weiterhin jede Form der 
rechtlichen Verantwortung ab. Außerdem fehlt für die weltweite Regulierung eine 
einheitliche Rechtsgrundlage, was dazu führt, dass neue Richtlinien nur auf 
freiwilliger Basis erfolgen können. Daher bietet eine Verringerung der Regulation die 
meisten Chancen, den Einfluss von Ratingagenturen zu mildern. In der 
Vergangenheit hat gerade übermäßige Regulation dazu geführt, dass sich 
vornehmlich institutionelle Investoren blind auf Kreditratings verlassen haben. Damit 
haben Ratingänderungen eine automatische Reaktion hervorgerufen. Diese Situation 
bestärkt den Ansatz, bei der Regulierung mehr auf die Verwendung dieser Ratings 
einzugehen, statt auf ihr Zustandekommen. Dies bietet zusätzlich den Vorteil, dass 
die Verwendung und Einbindung rechtlich leicht durchsetzbar ist, zumindest 
innerhalb der EU. Die aktuelle Fassung der Basel III Richtlinie scheint dabei bereits 
auf diesen Aspekt einzugehen, da die Nutzung von externen Ratings eingeschränkt 
wird.  
 
Dazu führt eine Verringerung der Regulation zu einem verstärkten 
Marktmechanismus, der allerdings durch erhöhte Transparenz bezüglich der 
angewandten Methoden unterstützt werden sollte. Die Errichtung einer europäischen 
Ratingagentur kann dagegen als wenig aussichtsreich eingestuft werden. Da in der 
Ratingindustrie bereits jetzt zahlreiche Agenturen ihre Dienste anbieten, die aber am 
globalen Markt keine relevante Rolle spielen, kann davon ausgegangen werden, 
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